Imagine an employee receives an email that looks like it came from a familiar service. They follow the link, enter their username and password, and move on with their day.
The password is now in someone else's hands.
If that account has no second authentication factor, the attacker may have everything needed to sign in. MFA changes that equation by requiring another proof of identity.
That is why MFA deserves to be treated as a priority control, not a checkbox at the bottom of an IT list.
Start with the accounts that matter most
For a small business, "enable MFA everywhere" can sound simple until someone has to implement it across Microsoft 365, Google Workspace, banking portals, cloud applications, VPNs, administrator accounts, and other services.
The better starting point is risk.
ORAGROL's Cyber Health Assessment treats Multi-Factor Authentication, Passwords & Login Security, and Access Control & Permissions as separate assessment areas because authentication is only one part of the identity picture.
Start with accounts that can cause the most damage if compromised:
- administrator accounts
- business email
- remote access
- cloud platforms containing sensitive information
- financial and payment-related accounts
- systems containing customer or employee information
The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security recommends prioritizing high-value accounts, including administrative and senior-management email accounts, when rolling out MFA. It also recommends considering MFA for all users, systems, applications, and endpoints where appropriate. [Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, ITSAP.00.105]
Not all MFA is equally strong
MFA is an additional layer, but the method matters.
The Canadian Cyber Centre recommends stronger authentication methods such as authenticator applications and hardware-based, FIDO-compatible solutions. It cautions that SMS is less secure and should generally be limited to lower-risk situations. [Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, ITSAP.00.105]
For an SMB, the practical progression is:
First: turn on MFA for important accounts.
Then: move higher-risk users and systems toward stronger, phishing-resistant authentication where supported.
Finally: make the policy consistent rather than leaving MFA as an optional setting that employees can quietly ignore.
MFA does not replace good access control
A business can have MFA enabled and still have poor identity security.
Consider a former employee whose account remains active. MFA may still be protecting that account, but the business should not have left the account available in the first place.
That is why ORAGROL's assessment also looks at Access Control & Permissions.
A practical identity review should ask:
- Are unique credentials used?
- Is MFA enforced?
- Are administrator privileges limited?
- Are former employees removed promptly?
- Are shared accounts avoided?
- Are sensitive systems protected by stronger authentication?
- Are access permissions reviewed when roles change?
MFA is a barrier. It is not a complete identity strategy.
The MFA mistake that costs organizations trust
One common mistake is treating deployment as a technology-only project.
The Cyber Centre specifically recommends preparing users, explaining why MFA is being introduced, training them to recognize MFA fatigue or push-bombing, and providing a way to report suspicious authentication prompts. [Source: Canadian Centre for Cyber Security, ITSAP.00.105]
That matters because employees are part of the control.
If someone receives repeated unexpected MFA prompts, the correct response is not to approve one just to make the notifications stop. The correct response is to report it.
Where ORAGROL looks at MFA
In the Cyber Health Assessment, MFA is not viewed in isolation. It sits alongside:
- Passwords & Login Security
- Access Control & Permissions
- Email Security
- Remote Work & Personal Devices
- Cloud Platform Security
- Employee Security Awareness & Training
- Incident Response & Reporting
That gives a business a more useful question than "Do we have MFA?" The better question is: Where would a stolen credential still give an attacker too much access?